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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
fore, that the article, involved in the principal case, dealing with the
private life of plaintiff should not have been privileged even had it
been published at the time plaintiff wa offering his talents to the
public. Why, then, should the article be privileged, when published
almost three decades later?
The court justifies its decision by saying that " . . . The mis-
fortunes and frailities of neighbors and public figures are subjects
of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population.
And when such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise
for a court to bar their expression in the newspapers and magazines
of the day."'12 But only reasonable custom and usage will justify an
act.'3 Thirty years' retirement from public life should end the general
public's interest in the plaintiff.14 But the instant case indicates that
the plaintiff cannot regain his privacy. The public will always have
such an interest in his life. To deprive a person desiring seclusion
of protection from public comment because of events long since past
seems to be an undesirable limitation upon his right of privacy.15
P.C.M.
MUTUAL VITUPERATION IN LIBEL
The plaintiff published in a newspaper a letter which libeled the
defendant. A week later the defendant published in the same news-
paper a letter which libeled plaintiff. The plaintiff sued and the
64 Fed. 280 (D. Mass. 1894). The court in Atkinson v. Do-
herty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899) denied the existence of
the right of privacy, but in commenting upon the Coriiss case said,
"We are loathe to believe that the man who makes himself useful
to mankind surrenders any right of privacy thereby."
12 Sides v. F-R. Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 806, 809 (C.C.A. 2d,
1940).
13 6 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1905) 776.
An exception to this rule seems to be found, however, in the case
of acts done by physicians and surgeons in practice. Supra vol.
5 at p. 1083.
14 The court in the principal case did not mention the case of Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939) in which
recovery for invasion of plaintiff's right of privacy was allowed
against defendant, who broadcast a reproduction of a holdup in
which plaintiff had been the victim. In that case less than two
years had elapsed between time of hold-up and tortious publica-
tion, but yet invasion was not privileged-a fact which would seem
to indicate that the court felt there was no public interest remain-
ing.
15 No Indiana cases have been found discussing right of privacy by
that name, but the Indiana Supreme Court has held that in an
action for slander the defendant is not entitled, under a plea ofjustification, to an order requiring plaintiff to submit to a medical
examination. Kern v. Bridwell, 119 Ind. 226, 21 N. E. 664 (1889).
But cf. South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (1901)
(Upheld order for examinatiorn in personal injury suit). The
former decision, since it resulted in the preservation of the plain-
tiff's dignity, may tend to show the position Indiana courts will
take when the question of right of privacy comes clearly before
them.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
defendant claimed his letter was in answer to the plaintiff's. Held,
for defendant. In case of mutual vituperation neither party can re-
cover damages. Kenner v. Milner, 196 So. 535 (La. 1940).
The prevailing view in United States and England grants de-
famed persons a qualified privilege to answer defamatory charges.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 594, comment i; HARPER, TORTS (1933)
§249; cf. Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C.M. & R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. R.
1044, 1049 (Ex. 1834). Where the answer is published fairly as an
answer, without malice, and for the purpose of repelling the charge,
it is privileged although it is false. Duncan v. Record Publishing Co.,
131 S.C. 483, 127 S.E. 606 (1925); Clffin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1
S.E. 803 (1887), 84 Va. 884, 6 S.E. 474 (1888); Laughton v.. Bishop
of Sodor and Man, 9 Moore P.C.C. (N.S.) 318, 17 Eng. Rep. R. 534
(P.C. 1872). If the answer is unconnected with the plaintiff's charge
the defendant has exceeded his privilege. Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich.
526, 80 N.W. 575, 46 L.R.A. 397 (1899). This problem seems analagous
to the assault and battery situation where the defendant can resist
plaintiff's attack with only so much force as is necessary for his de-
fense. Several jurisdictions, including federal courts, have allowed
evidence of plaintiff's previous libel only to mitigate plaintiff's dam-
ages. Shattuc v. McArthur, 29 Fed. 136 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1886); Stewart
v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 41 Minn. 71, 42 N.W. 787 (1889); Xavier
v. Oliver, 80 App. Div. 292, 80 N.Y.S. 225 (1903). This is limited
further by refusing even mitigation where a considerable period of
time has elapsed. Battel v. Wallace, 30 Fed. 229 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) ;
Keller v. American Bottlers' Publishing Co., et al., 140 App. Div. 311,
125 N.Y.S. 212 (1910). The unique Louisiana rule that neither party
can recover in case of mutual vituperation had its beginning in a
slander case. Fulda v. Caldwell, 9 La. Ann. 358 (1854). There the
court asserted, as the basis for its decision, "It is not fit that such
cases as this record presents should be brought before the courts."
Later, in Bigney v. Van Benthuysen et al., 36 La. Ann. 38 (1884), the
rule was extended to libel actions. In that case the court relied upon
a quotation from ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER (1st ed. 1881) 228, (6th
ed. 1929) 240, that "a man, who himself commences a newspaper war,
can not subsequently complain because he has the worst of the fray."
The court apparently ignored a subsequent qualifying sentence that,
"The privilege extends only to such retorts as are fairly an answer
to the plaintiff's attacks." The principal case, however, reaffairms
earlier Louisiana decisions, but is opposed to the established rule in
other jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 594, comment i.
J.L.F.
TRADE REGULATION
PRICE FIXING AGREEMENTS AND THE SHERMAN ACT
United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., reaffirms the hostile
attitude of the United States Supreme Court toward any combination
tampering with competitive prices. The Court pronounced illegal per
%310 U.S. 150 (1940).
